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Abstract. The study deals with the enduring conflict between
India and Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir since 1947. The
ongoing conflict is analyzed as an enduring rivalry; characterized
by three major wars (1947-48), 1965, 1971, low intensity
military conflict (Siachen), mini war at Kargil (1999), internal
insurgency, cross border terrorism. We examine the progress and
the status of the dispute, as well as the dynamics of the India
Pakistan relationship by considering the influence of USA and
China in crisis dynamics. We discuss the possible solutions
offered by the various study groups and persons. Most of the
studies were done in crisp environment. Pramanik and Roy (S.

Jammu-Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan.
International Journal of Mathematical Archive (IJMA),
4(8) (2013), 162-170.) studied game theoretic model toJammu
and Kashmir conflict in crisp environment. In the present study
we have extended the concept of the game theoric model of the
Jammu and Kashmir conflict in neutrosophic envirorment. We
have explored the possibilities and developed arguments for an
application of principle of neutrosophic game theory to
understand properly of the Jammu and Kashmir conflict in terms
of goals and strategy of either side. Standard 2×2 zero-sum game
theoretic model used to identify an optimal solution.

Pramanik and T.K. Roy, Game theoretic model to the
Keywords: Conflict resolution, game theory, Jammu and Kashmir conflict, neutrosophic membership function, optimal solution saddle point, zero-sum game.

1 Introduction
The purpose of this study is to develop neutrosophic game
theoretic model to India-Pakistan (Indo-Pak) crisis
dynamics and contribute to the neutrosophic analysis of
conflicts and their neutrosophic resolution. M. Intriligator
[1] reviewed mathematical approaches to the study of
conflict resolutions in crisp environment. He prepared a
list of primary methodological thrusts as differential
equations, decision and control theory, game and
bargaining theory, uncertainty analysis, stability theory,
action-reaction models and organization theory.
Anandalingam and Apprey [2] proposed multilevel
mathematical programming model in order to develop a
conflict resolution theory based on the integration of noncooperative game within a mathematical paradigm. They
postulated conflict problem as a Stackelberg [3]
optimization with leaders and followers. However, the
model is suitable only for the normal version of
information distribution [4] when the strategy of all lowerlevel players is completely known to the leader. Yakir
Plessner [5] employed the game theoretic model to resolve
the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Pramanik
and Roy [6] studied game theoretic model to the J&K
conflict between India and Pakistan in crisp environment.
But the situation and relation between India and Pakistan
are not static but dynamic and neutrosophic in nature. So
new approach is required to deal with the conflict.

Our contribution to the literature is to discuss briefly the
genesis of the conflict and apply neutrosophic game theory
for conflict resolution.
Rest of the paper is organized in the following way.
Section 2 presents some basics of neutrosophy and
neutrosophic sets and their operations. Section 3 describes
a brief history and the genesis of Jammu and Kashmir
conflict. Section 4 is devoted to formulation neutrosophic
game theoretic model to Jammu and Kashmir conflict
between India and Pakistan. Section 5 presents concluding
remarks.
2. Basics of neutrosophy and neutrosophic sets
In this section, we present some basic definitions of
neutrosophy, and neutrosophic sets and their operations
due to Smrandache [7] and Wang et al.[8].
Definition 1. Neutrosophy: A new branch of philosophy,
introduced by Florentin Smarandache that presents the
origin, nature, and scope of neutralities, as well as their
interactions with different ideational spectra.
Neutrosophy is the basis of neutrosophic set, neutrosophic
probability, and neutrosophic statistics.
Definition 2. Infinitesimal number: ε is said to be
infinitesimal number if and only if for all positive integers
n, ε < 1/n
Definition 3. Hyper-real number: Let ε > 0 be an
infinitesimal number. The hyper-real number set is an
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extension of the real number set, which includes classes of
infinite numbers and classes of infinitesimal numbers.
Definition 4. Non-standard finite number: 1+ = 1+ ε ,
where “1” is its standard part and “ ε ” its - non-standard
part
Definition 5. Non-standard finite number: -0 = 0- ε , and
“0” is standard part and “ ε ” is its non-standard part.
Definition 6. A non-standard unit interval: A non-standard
unit interval can be defined as ||--0, 1+-||. Here -0 is nonstandard number infinitely small but less than 0 and 1+ is
non-standard number infinitely small but greater than 1.
Main Principle: Between an idea < ψ > and its opposite
<Anti- ψ >, there is a continuum-power spectrum of neutralities <Neut- ψ >.
Fundamental Thesis: Any idea <X> is T% true, I% indeterminate, and F% false, where T, I, F belong to subset of
nonstandard unit interval ||-0, 1+|| and their sum is not
restricted to 100%.
Definition 7. Let X be a space of points (objects) with
generic element in X denoted by x. Then a neutrosophic set
A in X is characterized by a truth membership function TA,
an indeterminacy membership function IA and a falsity
membership function FA. The functions TA, IA and FA are
real standard or non-standard subsets of] 0-, 1+[ i.e.
TA : X → ]0-, 1+[ ; IA : X → ]0-, 1+[; FA : X → ]0-, 1+[
It should be noted that there is no restriction on the sum of
TA(x), IA(x), FA(x) i.e. 0- ≤ TA(x) + IA(x) +FA(x) ≤ 3+.
Definition 8. The complement of a neutrosophic set A is
denoted by A c and is defined by
T c ( x ) = {1+ } − TA ( x ) ; I c ( x ) = {1+ } − I A ( x ) ;
A

A

F c ( x ) = {1+ } − FA ( x )
A

Definition 9. A neutrosophic set A is contained in the other
neutrosophic set B, A ⊆ B if and only if the following result
holds.
inf TA ( x ) ≤ inf TB ( x ) , sup TA ( x ) ≤ sup TB ( x )
(1)
inf I A ( x ) ≥ inf I B ( x ) , sup I A ( x ) ≥ sup I B ( x )
(2)
inf FA ( x ) ≥ inf FB ( x ) , sup FA ( x ) ≥ sup FB ( x )
(3)
for all x in X.
Definition 10. Single-valued neutrosophic set (SVNS): Let
X be a universal space of points (objects) with a generic
element of X denoted by x. A single-valued neutrosophic
~
set N ⊂ X is characterized by a true membership function
TN~ ( x ) , a falsity membership function FN~ ( x ) and an

indeterminacy function I N~ ( x ) with TN~ ( x ), I N~ ( x ), FN~ ( x )∈
[0, 1] for all x in X.
~
When X is continuous a SVNSs, N can be written as
~
N = ∫ TN~ ( x ), I N~ ( x ), FN~ ( x ) x, ∀x ∈X.
x

~
and when X is discrete a SVNSs N can be written as
~ m
N = ∑ TN~ ( x ), I N~ ( x ), FN~ ( x ) / x , ∀x ∈X.
i =1

SVNS is an instance of neutrosophic set that can be used in
real life situations like decision making, scientific and engineering applications. In case of SVNS, the degree of the
truth membership TN~ ( x ), the indeterminacy membership
I N~ ( x ) and the falsity membership FN~ ( x ) values belong to

[0, 1].
~
It should be noted that for a SVNS N,
0 ≤ sup TN~ ( x ) + sup I N~ ( x ) + sup FN~ ( x ) ≤ 3 , ∀x ∈X.

(4)

and for a neutrosophic set, the following relation holds
0 - ≤ sup TN~ ( x ) + sup I N~ ( x ) + sup FN~ ( x ) ≤ 3+ , ∀x ∈X. (5)
~
Definition 11. The complement of a neutrosophic set N is
~
denoted by N c and is defined by
T ~ c ( x ) = FN~ ( x ) ; I ~ c ( x ) = 1 − I N~ ( x ) ; F ~ c ( x ) = TN~ ( x )
N
N
N
~
Definition 12. A SVNS NA is contained in the other
~
~
~
SVNS NB , denoted as NA ⊆ NB , if and only if
TN~ ( x ) ≤ TN~ ( x ) ; I N~ ( x ) ≥ I N~ ( x ) ; FN~ ( x ) ≥ FN~ ( x )
A

B

A

B

A

B

∀x ∈X.

~
~
Definition 13. Two SVNSs NA and NB are equal, i.e.
~
~
~
~
~
~
NA = NB , if and only if NA ⊆NB and NA ⊇ NB .
~
Definition 14. Union: The union of two SVNSs NA and
~
~
~
~
~
NB is a SVNS NC , written as NC = NA ∪NB . Its truth
membership, indeterminacy-membership and falsity membership functions are related as follows:
TN~ ( x ) = max ( TN~ ( x ), TN~ ( x )) ;
C

A

B

I N~ ( x ) = max ( I N~ ( x ), I N~ ( x )) ;
C

A

B

FN~ ( x ) = min ( FN~ ( x ), FN~ ( x )) for all x in X.
C

A

B

Definition 15. Intersection: The intersection of two SVNSs
~
~
~
~
~
~
NA and NB is a SVNS NC , written as NC = NA ∩NB ,
whose truth membership, indeterminacy-membership and
falsity membership functions are related as follows:
TN~ ( x ) = min ( TN~ ( x ), TN~ ( x )) ;
C

A

B

I N~ ( x ) = min ( I N~ ( x ), I N~ ( x )) ;
C

A

B

FN~ ( x ) = max ( FN~ ( x ), FN~ ( x )) for all x in X.
C

A

B

3. Brief history and the genesis of Jammu and
Kashmir conflict
It is said that Kashmir is more beautiful than the heaven,
and the benefactor of the supreme blessing and happiness.
The account of Kashmir is found in the oldest extant book“Nilamat Purana”. Kalhan, Kashmir’s greatest historian
scholarly depicted the history of Kashmir starting just

Surapati Pramanik, Tapan Kumar Roy, Neutrosophic Game Theoretic Approach to Indo-Pak Conflict over Jammu-Kashmir

84

before the great Mahabharata War. According to Kalhan,
the Mauryan emperor Ashoka annexed Kashmir in 250
B.C. He embraced Buddhism after the Kalinga war. He
made it a state religion. He built many Bihars, temples
specially Shiva temple. According to Chinese traveler,
Huen Tsang over five thousand Buddhist Monks settled
down in Kashmir during the reign of Ashoka. After the fall
of Maurya dynasty, it is believed that Kashmir for over two
hundred years was ruled by Indo-Greek Kings before the
start of "Turushka" (Kushan ) rule in the state. Thus, the
people of Kashmir came in contact with the Greeks. The
reflection of which is found on the beautiful architectural
and sculptural style of old Kashmiri temples, and the
coinage of the later Kashmiri kings.
The zenith of Buddhist power in Kashmir was reached in
the reign of king Kanishka. Influenced by Indian culture,
Kanishka adopted Buddhism and made it the state religion.
During his reign, it is believed that the forth Buddhist
Council was held at Kundalavana in Kashmir. It was
enthusiastically attended by a large number of scholars,
theoreticians, and commentators. . During his reign,
Buddhism propagated in Tibet, China and Central Asia.
However, Buddhism was followed by a revival of
Hinduism and Hindu rulers ruled Kashmir up to 1320.
Rinchan (1320-1323) ascended the throne on 6th October
1320. He was the first converted Islam ruler in the history
of Kashmir. Shah Mir ascended the throne with the title of
Sultan Shamsuddin (1339-1342) in 1339 A.D. and ShahMir dynasty (1339-1561) ruled the state for 222 years.
Shah Mir dynasty is one of the most important in the
annals of Kashmir, in as much as Islam was firmly
established here. During Chak rule (1561-1586) Sunnni
Muslims and Hindus alike were persecuted.
Akbar, the Mughal Emperor annexed Kashmir in 1586. It
is important to note that under the Mughal reign (15861752), people got slight relief and lived honorably.
However, the Mughal used forced labor in their visits to
Kashmir in terms of a huge retinue of unpaid laborers to
carry their goods and other supplies for the journey.
Afghan rule (1752-1819) succeeded in maintaining their
suzerainty over Kashmir for a span of sixty-seven years.
The Afghans were highly unscrupulous in the employment
of forced labor. The common Kashmirian people were
tired of their ferocity, barbarity and persecution. It is true
history of Kashmir that all sections of people suffered
during Afghan rule but the principal victims of these cruel
were the peasants. During this era all cruel and inhuman
measures of Afghan rulers could not put an end the basic
tradition of Kashmiri.
The reign of Sikh Power (1819-1846) in Kashmir lasted for
only 27 years. It is to be noted that the Sikhs continued
with the practice of forced labor in order to transport of
goods and materials. According to Lawrence [9], "to all
classes in Kashmir to see the downfall of the evil rule of
Pathan, and to none was the relief greater than to the
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peasants who had been cruelly fleeced by the rapacious
sardars of Kabul. I do not mean to suggest that the Sikh
rule was benign or good, but it was at any rate better that
that of the Pathans.”

3.1 Dogra rule (1846-1947)
Dogra dynesty played an in important role in developing
Jammu and Kahmir State.

3.1.1 Gulab Singh (1846-1857)
The State of Jammu was conferred on Gulab Singh with
the title of Raja by Maharaja Ranjit Singh of Punjab in
1820. He annexed Ladakh in September 1842. Some parts
of Gilgit and Baltistan were invaded before 1846. The
State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is founded through
Amritsar treaty in 1846 between the East India Company
and Raja Gulab Singh who buys Kashmir Valley from the
East India Company for Rs. 7.5 million and annexes it to
Jammu and Ladakh already under his rule. Thus the Dogra
dynesty establishes in 1846. Gulab Singh conquered
Muzaffarabad in 1854.
3.1.2 Ranbir Singh (1857-1885)
Ranbir Singh (1857-1885) ascended the throne after his
father death in 1857 A.D., who ruled from 1857 to 1885
A.D. Lord Northbook’s Government recommended for a
political officer to reside permanently at the Maharaja’s
Court in September 26, 1873 A.D. A British Resident
remained permanently at the court of Maharaja relating to
the external relations of British India from 1873.
3.1.3 Maharaja Pratap Singh (1885-1925)
Maharaja Pratap Singh (1885-1925) ascended the throne
after his father death in 1885. During his rule, British
power was deeply interested in Kashmir and through
British Resident Maharaja Pratap Singh was kept under
pressure. In September 1885 during the initial stage of
Pratap Singh’s rule, the British Government changed the
status of the British officer Special Duty in Kashmir to that
of a political Resident. Pratap Singh's Address in Durbar
October 19, 1885 revealed that the position of political
officer in Kashmir has been placed on the same footing
with that of Residents in other Indian States in subordinate
alliance with the Government. British Government of India
disposed Maharaja in 1889. Maharaja was offered an
allowance, which was ungenerously described as sufficient
for dignity but not for extravagance, would be made to him.
No specific period was set for this arrangement to come to
an end. Colonel Nisbet, Resident of Kashmir became the
virtual ruler because although the Council of minister
would have full powers of administration, they would be
expected to exercise those powers under the guidance of
the British Resident. Without consulting with him, Council
would not take any important decision and the Council
would follow Resident’s advice whenever it was offered.
In 1889, the British Government instituted Gilgit Agency
under the direct rule of British political agent. Colonel
Algeron Durand [10], the first British Agent in Gilgit
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records the Russian influence for creation of Gilgit Agency
in his Book, “The Making of a Frontier”. He remarked in a
statement “Why it has been asked should it be worth our
while to interfere there whatever happened? The answer is
of course Russia…Expensive as the Gilgit game might
have been, it was worth the Candle.” Viceroy Lord
Curzon reinstated Maharaja Pratap Singh in power in 1905
A.D. The State Council is abolished in May 1906 A.D.

3.1.4 Hari Singh (1925-1947)
Hari Singh (1925-1947) ascended the throne after his
grandfather, Pratap Singh’s death in 1925. During his rule
the agitation against the Dogra rule started mainly against
the misrule, corrupt administration, autocratic rule,
repression on the subjects at the slightest excuse and lack
of administrative efficiency. Maharaja Hari ruthlessly
crushed a mass uprising in 1931. Hari Singh constituted
Grievances Enquiry Commission headed by B .J. Glancy
on 12 November 1931 for a probe into the complaints of
the people of Kashmir. In April 1932, the commission
recommended
its
suggestions.
Among
these
recommendations, the important one was the step to be
taken for propagating education for Kashmiri Muslims.
The Commission recommended to give payment [11]
Kashmiri people for Government work. In the order dated
31 May 1932, Maharaja Hari Singh accepted the
recommendation of the President of the Kashmir
Constitutional Reforms Committee, B. J. Glancy and
appointed a Franchise Committee to put forward tentative
suggestion regarding the important question of the
franchise and the composition of the assembly. In this
background All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference
(AJKMC) was formed under the leadership of Sheikh
Abdullah in 1932 in October in Srinagar. The conference
held from 15 to 17 October 1932.
In 1934, the Muslim Conference demonstrated its secular
view when it forwarded memorandum drafted by Ghulam
Abbus to the Maharaja demanding early implementation of
the report of Glancy Commission and specifically urged
for a system of joint electorates in the State. In 1934,
Maharaja introduced a Legislative Assembly. However 35
of its 75 members were to be nominated. 8 per cent of the
population was allowed to cast vote. To become a voter
literacy and property qualifications were specified. The
Assembly enjoyed only consultative powers. Maharaja
further reformed making the provision for Council of
Ministers and a judicial and legislative branch of public
administration in 1939. However, Maharaja enjoyed most
of the decision powers under the new reforms.
On 26 March 1938 Sheik Abdullah iterated two important
points: i) to put an end communalism by ceasing to think in
terms of Muslims-non-Muslims when discussing political
problems. ii) Universal suffrage on the basis of joint
electorate. It is to be noted that the national demand issued
in August 1938 was signed among others by Pandit Jia Lal
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Kilam, Pandit Lal Saraf, Pandit Kasyap Bandhu. Under the
leadership of Sheik Abdullah AJKMC felt the necessity of
common platform to struggle against the rule of Maharaja.
After series of discussions and debates, the working
committee of AJKMC took the historic decision of rechristening to Jammu and Kashmir National Conference
(or simply National Conference) on 24 June 1938. On 27
April 1939, National Conference came into being. Its
secular credentials set a new pace for the politics of Jammu
Kashmir. National Conference [12] consisted of many
leaders of minority communities like Hindu, Sikh etc
during 1940s.
In the history of India subcontinent, the Pakistan resolution
demanding the creation of an independent state comprised
of all regions in which Muslims are the majority is passed
at Iqbal Park, Lahore on March 23, 1940 by Muslim
League.
The secularization of Kashmir politics and redefinition of
the goal helped immensely National Conference to come in
close contact with the Indian National Congress. In 1942
‘New Kashmir’ manifesto was formulated under the
leadership of Dr. N. N. Raina by a brilliant group of young
communist operating within the National Conference who
were mostly responsible for introducing the nationalist
movement to the concept of socialist pattern of society
based on equality, democracy and free from exploitation. It
consists of two parts: a) the constitution of the state; b) the
National Economic Plan. Under the sound leadership of
Abdullah, National Conference led a powerful mass
movement in order to find a new political and economic
order in Kashmir and other parts of Jammu region. The
National Conference started agitation against the Dogra
rule in 1945. In the grave political situation, offering him
all charges, Ram Chandra Kak was appointed as Prime
Minister in order to bring the agitation in control. In May
1946 National Conference launched “Quit Kashmir”
movement following the “Quit India Movement” in 1942
led by the Indian National Congress. Mohamod Ali Jinnah
was not interested in the ‘Quit Kashmir Movement’[13]
rather blamed the movement as act of Gundas. In March
1946 Crisps Mission came to visit India. Sheikh Abdullah
sent a telegram by demanding freedom of people of
Kashmir on withdrawal of British power from India.
Prime Minister of J&K Ram Chandra Kak declared
emergency to crackdown the movement. Abdullah was
arrested on 20 May 1946. The State Government employed
a wave of arrests and a policy of repression throughout the
State. The people protested strongly and several agitated
Kashmiri people were killed and injured due to clash with
armed forces of Maharaja. The Indian National Congress
and the All India States peoples’ Conference supported
National Conference strongly. Sheik Abdullah was
imprisoned for three years for antinational activities.
National Conference was banned. In January 1947,
National Conference boycotted elections because of
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repression. Muslim Conference grabbed the opportunity
and won 16 out of 21 Muslim seats.

Sikh, one Christian-and one Parsee. It started functioning
on 2nd September 1946. The League joined the Interim
Government in the last week of October 1946 but was not
3.2 Muslim Conference
prepared to join the Constituent Assembly, which led every
Muslim Conference did not support the ‘Quit Kashmir’ day a more and more difficult and delicate on account of
agitation. Muslim Conference discouraged the people of the differences between the cabinet ministers of Congress
Kashmir from joining the agitation in the same tune of and the Muslim League. 0n 26 November 1946, Mr. Atlee
Muslim League. On 30 May 1946, Chaudhury Gulam invited Lord Wavell and representatives of the Congress
Abbas the President of Muslim Conference stated that the
and the Muslim League to meet in London to attempt to
agitation had started at Congress leaders’ behest in order to
resolve the deadlock The discussions were held from 3 to 6
“restore the lost prestige of the Nationalist.” The Muslim
December 1946 but did not yield any agreed settlement.
Conference adopts the Azad Kashmir Resolution on 26
The first meeting of the Constituent Assembly of India was
July 1946 calling for the end of autocratic Dogra rule in the
held in on 11 December 1946. The Muslim League
region and claiming the right to elect their own constituent
boycotted it and it developed a stake in sabotaging the
assembly. He said that the primary task [14]was to restore
Assembly’s work.
the unity of the Muslim nation and there be “no other place
On 20 February 1947, Prime Minister Atlee declared that
for an honest and self-respecting Muslim but in his own
Britain would transfer power by June 1948, by which time
organization.” On 25 October 1946, State Government
the Congress and the Muslim League were supposed to rearrested and detained four top leaders of Muslim
solve their differences. On 24 March Mountbatten was
Conferences.
sworn in as Viceroy and Governor General of India in
place of Wavell. After negotiations with the leaders of dif3.3 British Cabinet Mission
ferent political parties, Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten anIn March 1946, The British Cabinet Mission held nounced that long before June 1948, the Dominions of Inconference about a week at Simla with four representatives, dia and Pakistan would be created and that the question of
two each of the Congress and the Muslim Leagues and the Indian states would be dealt with in the light of the Cabinet
conference broke down on the issue of Pakistan and parity Mission's memorandum [16] of 12 May 1946.To approve
in the proposed interim government. On 16 May 1946, the the Mountbatten plan accepted by British Cabinet, a confeCabinet Mission announced their own proposals, the rence between Mountbatten and representatives of the
essence of which was the creation of a Constituent Congress and the Muslim League was held on 2 June 1947.
Assembly to frame the Constitution of India, which was to On 3 June 1947 a White paper was issued which stated the
be based on the principle that the Center would control detail procedure of the partition of India. Regarding the
only three subjects, viz., Defense, Foreign Affairs and Princely States it declared that British policy towards InCommunications and the creation of three group of dian States contained in the Cabinet Mission’s memoranprovinces-two of the areas claimed by Muslim League for dum [17] of 12th may, 1946 remained unchanged.
Pakistan in the east and the west and the third of the rest of
3.5 Partition Plan accepted by Congress
the subcontinent [15].

3.4 Interim Government announced
On 25 June 1946, the Congress Working Committee
announced their rejection of the plan of Interim
Government. On June 26, 1946, Lord Wavell announced
that he would set up a temporary ‘caretaker’ Government
of officials to carry on in the interim period.
In July 1946, the Muslim League withdrew its acceptance
of the Cabinet Mission’s plan and resolved that “now the
time has come for the Muslim nation to resort to direct
action to achieve Pakistan, to assert their just rights, to
vindicate their honor and to get rid of the present British
slavery and the contemplated future ‘caste- Hindu
domination” at a meeting in Bombay.
Accepting the invitation from the Viceroy to constitute an
interim Government, on 6 August 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru
formed it, which consisted of six Hindus, including one
Depressed Class member, three Muslims of whom two
belonged neither to the Congress nor to the League, one

On 14 June 1947, in a historic session of All India
Congress Committee (AICC) in New Delhi, Pandit Ballabh
Pant moved the resolution dealing with the Mountbatten
plan for partition British India. Mahatma Gandhi
intervened in the debate in the second day and expressed
that he was always against the partition but situation had
changed and appealed to support the resolution. On 15
June 1947, the resolution was passed with 29 votes in favor
and 15 against.
Mr. Jinnah clearly expressed Muslim League view [18] on
the question of Princely States on 17 June 1947 by saying
"Constitutionally and legally the Indian states will be
independent sovereign states on the termination of
paramountcy and they will be free to decide for themselves
and adopt any course they like; it is open to them to join
the Hindustan Constitutional Assembly or decide to remain
independent. In case they opt for independence they would
enter into such agreements or relationships with Hindustan
or Pakistan as they may choose".

3.6 Partition and riots
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Calcutta, capital of Bengal witnessed a beginning of
holocaust on an unprecedented scale on 16 August 1946,
which was declared a public holiday by the Muslim
League Government of Bengal. It was estimated that
Jinnah’s direct action [18] caused death of more than 5000
lives, and over 15000 people were injured, besides 100000
being rendered homeless. After a fortnight 560 people
were killed in Bombay. After Calcutta, on October 1946,
serious anti- Hindu riots erupted in Noakhali in East
Bengal followed by massacred of Muslims in Bihar The
chain reaction of riots started in the Punjab causing large
scale killings of Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims shortly
afterwards.

3.7 Development in Jammu and Kashmir
Based on two-nation theory, India was partitioned into
Pakistan and India in August 14, 1947. The princely states
were offered the right under the ‘Indian Independent Act
1947’ and ‘Government of Indian Act 1935’ [19] to
accede either to India or Pakistan or remain independent. It
seemed that Hari Singh, the then Maharaja of Jammu and
Kashmir hoped to create independent Kingdom or
autonomy from India and Pakistan. He did not accede to
either of two successor dominions at the time of accession.
All Jammu and Kashmir Rajya Hindu Sabha passed a
resolution [20] expressing its faith in Maharaja Hari Singh
and extended its “support to whatever he was doing or
might do on the issue of accession” in 1947. On 15 June
1947, an important resolution [21] regarding the princely
states saying the lapse of paramountcy does not lead to the
independence of the princely states was adopted by AICC
unanimously. Contrary to this, Mr. Jinnah clearly
expressed the view [18] of Muslim League on the question
of Princely States on 17 June 1947 by saying
"Constitutionally and legally the Indian states will be
independent sovereign states on the termination of
paramountcy and they will be free to decide for themselves
and adopt any course they like; it is open to them to join
the Hindustan Constitutional Assembly or the Pakistan
Constituent Assembly, or decide to remain independent. In
the last case, they enter into such agreements or
relationship with Hindusthan or Pakistan as they may
choose ".
On 19 July 1947, the working committee of Muslim
Conference passed a modified resolution [22] in favor of
independence, which respectfully and fervently appealed to
the Maharaja to declare internal autonomy of the state and
accede to Pakistan regarding to defense, communication
and external affairs. Khurshid Ahmad, Jinnah’s personal
Secretary during his stay in Kashmir on the crucial days
for the question of accession gave Maharaja assurance [23]
that “Pakistan would not touch a hair of his head or take
away a iota of his power”. Before partition British
Government restored the Gilgit area, an important strategic

region, hitherto administered by a British agency, to J&K
without taking the verdict of the local people.

3.8 Standstill Agreement
Pakistan became independent on 14 august 1947. India and
few princely states, which did not join either of India or
Pakistan, became independent on 15 August 1947. In this
way J&K attained the status of independent on 15 August
1947. On 15 August post offices in J&K hoisted the
Pakistani flags. Maharaja Hai Singh signed a standstill
agreement with Pakistan on 16 August 1947 with regard to
State’s postal services, railways, and communications and
hoped to sign similar agreement with India with regard to
external affairs, control of state forces, defense etc. India
[23] did not show any interest in the acceptance of the
offer of standstill agreement. . On 18 August 1947 a
controversy came into light when Sir Cyril Radcliffe
awarded a portion of Muslim majority Gurudaspur District
to India causing fundamental differences in J&K’s
geopolitical situation. The subcontinent experienced
communal riots during these days. By this time, Muslim
majority Poonch estate within the Jammu region
experienced serious troubles with regard to some local
demands like the rehabilitation of 60,000 demobilized
soldiers of the British army belonging to the area. The
agitation finally transformed into communal form having
mixed with other issues. The state army refused to fire on
the demonstrators with whom they had religious and ethnic
ties. The agitation turned to the form of armed revolt
because of mass desertion from army. The supply of arms
and ammunition and other assistance from outside the
border magnified the revolt. The Kashmir Socialist party
passed a resolution on 18 September 1947 to join Pakistan
and not India. The party impressed on Maharaja that
without any further unnecessary delay he should make an
announcement accordingly. It is to be noted here that a
convention of Muslim Conference workers formally asked
for accession to Pakistan on 22 September 1947.
Maharaja Hari Singh released Sheikh Abdullah from
prison along with some other National Conference workers
on 29 September 1947 but he did not release the workers
of Muslim Conference due to grave situation of the state.
Pakistan termed Abdullah’s release as a conspiracy
because workers of Muslim Conference were not
simultaneously released. By October, communal riots
spread all over J&K. The mass infiltration baked by
Pakistani army jeopardized the environment of the state.
Pakistan violated the standstill agreement by stopping
regular supply of food, salt, petrol and essential
commodities from Pakistan. The communication system
controlled by Pakistani Government did not render proper
service.
On 21 October 1947, Pakistan decided to settle the future
of Kashmir with the power of gun suspecting that Maharaja was likely to accede to India. Jinnah, the Governor Gen-
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eral of Pakistan personally authorized a plan [25] to launch
“a clandestine invasion by a force comprised of Pathan
(Afghan) tribesmen, ex-servicemen and soldiers on leave”.
It was witnessed that charges and counter charges were
being made by both the government of J&K and Pakistan
during the month of October and finally On 22 October
1947, 2000 tribesmen from Northwest Frontier Province
(NWFP) of Pakistan and other Pakistani nationals fully
armed with modern arms, under the command of trained
generals, started invasion to capturing the state’s territory.
The Muslims in the Western part of Kashmir established
their own independent (Azad) Kashmir Government on 24
October 1947. The State forces were wiped out in fighting.
The tribesmen resorted to “indiscriminate slaughter of both
Hindus and Muslims”[26]. They reached within 15 miles
from capital Srinagar. Under this great emergency of the
situation, Maharaja sought Indian military assistance in his
letter dated 26 October 1947 along with the ‘Instrument of
Accession’ [27] to Mountbatten, the Governor General of
India. Thereafter the Maharaja signed the instrument of
accession, which the Governor General Mountbatten
accepted on 27 October 1947 by adding that the question
of accession [28] should be settled by a referendum. Indian
forces [29] airlifted at Srinagar almost at the crucial
moment, for, “a few minutes later the airfield might well
have been in enemy hands”. Members of the National
Conference provided logistical support for the Indian
forces. Infuriated by Indian intervention, on 27 October
1947, Pakistani Governor General, Mohammed Ali Jinnah
ordered Lt. General Sir Douglas Gracey, Chief of the
Pakistani Army, to send Pakistani regular troops to
Kashmir, but Field Marshall Auchinleck, the Supreme
Commander of the transition period succeeded in
persuading him to withdraw his orders. A message [30]
was sent to the Governor General and the Prime Minister
of India to go to Lahore for discussion regarding Kashmir.
3.9 Indo-Pak talks

On 1 November 1947, at a meeting of Governors General
of India and Pakistan at Lahore, Mountbatten offered to resolve the J&K issue by holding referendum. Rejecting the
Mountbatten formula, M.A. Jinnah remarked that a plebiscite was “redundant and undesirable”. H.V. Hodson [31]
has recorded in his book, The Great Divide, that M.A. Jinnah “objected that with Indian troops present and Sheikh
Abdullah in power the people would be frightened to vote
for Pakistan”. Jinnah proposed a simultaneous withdrawal
of all forces- the Indian troops and the invading forces.
Here it is interesting to note that when he was asked how
anyone could guarantee that the latter would also be withdrawn, Jinnah [30] replied “If you do this I will call the
whole thing off”. In connection with the steps to ascertain
the wishes of the people of J&K, Mountbatten was in favor
of a plebiscite under the auspices of United Nations while
M. L. Jinnah proposed that he and Mountbatten should
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have plenary power to control and supervise the plebiscite.
Ultimately, the first direct bilateral talks broke down.
On 1 January 1948, based on the advice of Mountbatten,
India lodged a complaint with the Security Council
invoking articles 35 of Chapter VI of the UN Charter to
“recommend appropriate procedures or methods of
adjustment” for the pacific settlement of disputes and not
for “action” with respect to acts of aggression as provided
for in Chapter VII of the Charter [32]. India reiterated her
pledge of her conditional commitment to a plebiscite under
international auspices once the aggressor was evicted.
Pakistan contradicted the validity of the Maharaja’s
accession to India [33], and urged the Security Council to
appoint a commission for securing a cease-fire and
ensuring withdrawal of outside forces, and conducting a
plebiscite in order to determine the future of J&K.

3.10 Role of the United Nation Security Council
(UNSC)
Both India and Pakistan denied implementing the UN resolutions [34-36] for a free and impartial plebiscite in order
to put an end to the situation for the accession of J&K.
Having taken note of the developments in J&K, the United
Nations Commission for India and Pakistan UNCIP submitted a draft resolution [36] consisting of three parts to
the council on 13 August 1948.
Part I of the resolution comprised of instruction for a ceasefire.
Part II of the resolution dealt with the principle of a truce
agreement which called for Pakistan to withdraw tribesmen, Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who
had entered the State of J&K for the purpose of fighting, to
evacuate the territory occupied by Pakistan and after the
notice of the implementation of the above stipulation by
the UNCIP India was to withdraw the bulk of her forces in
stages from J&K leaving minimum strength with the approval of the commission in order to ensure law, order and
peace in the State.
Part III of the resolution appeared to be important as it
clearly expressed that both the Government of India and
the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the
future status of the State of J&K shall be determined in
accordance with the will of the people.
The second resolution [37] specified the basic principle of
plebiscite was formally adopted on 5 January 1949 after
acceptance of India and Pakistan on 23 and 25 December
1948 respectively.
An important development occurred when both India and
Pakistan agreed to the cease-fire line in 1949. This enabled
the UN to finally send a Military observer Group to supervise the line [38]. The ceasefire came into effect on 1 January 1949. The most important long- term outcome of the
first Indo-Pak war was the creation of ceasefire line. Thus
UNCIP succeeded in implementing the important provision of Part I of the resolution. In order to monitor to the
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ceasefire line (CFL), the UNCIP sent a Monitoring Group
for India and Pakistan (UNMGIP) to J&K on 24 January
1949 relying on its resolution of 13 august 1948. In Karachi on 27 July 1949, the military representatives of India
and Pakistan, duly authorized, approved CFL and thus approved the presence of UNMGIP [39].
In March 1949, the conflicting attitudes came into light as
India and Pakistan expressed their viewpoints before the
truce subcommittee of the UNCIP. On 15 April 1949,
UNCIP transmitted to the governments of India and Pakistan its own proposals [40], which were:
i)
to create a cease-fire line, eliminating all no
man’s lands and based on the factual position of
the troops in January 1949.
ii)
to draw a phased program of withdrawal of Pakistani troops to be completed in seven weeks,
and the withdrawal of all Pakistani nationals.
iii)
to ask Indian forces also to withdraw in accordance with a phased program after the withdrawn
of tribesmen and Pakistani national and after the
declaration of UNCIP’s satisfaction regarding the
troops withdrawal of Pakistan.
iv)
to release all prisoners of war within one month.
to repeal all emergency laws.
v)
vi)
to release all political prisoners.
Both India and Pakistan [41] could not accept the proposals because of their own interest.
The UNCIP proposed arbitration on the issues regarding
the part II of the resolution in a letter to the two Governments on 26 August 1949 and named Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz as the Arbitrator. Pakistan accepted the proposal on 7 September 1949 but India rejected this proposal of
arbitration. The Czechoslovak representative of the UNCIP, Dr. Oldrich Chyle (Chyle took the post after resignation of Korbel) criticized the UNCIP’s work [42]. According to him, the arbitration move was a pre-planned attempt
on the part of the USA and UK to intervene in the dispute.
On 17 December 1949, the UNSC named its president
General A. G. L. McNaughton of Canada as the Informal
Mediator [43], instead of commission to negotiate a demilitarization plan in consultation with India and Pakistan. He
submitted his proposal on 22 December 1949. Pakistan accepted the proposals, suggesting minor amendments while
India suggested major amendments: one calling for the
disbanding and disarming of Azad forces, and the other
dealing with the return of the Northern Areas to India for
purposes of defense and administration of J&K. Pakistan
was unable to accept Indian amendments [44] as a clear rejection of the proposals. Pakistan agreed to simultaneous
demilitarization but Indian rejected it on the grounds of the
legal and moral aspects of the plan.
The UNSC adopted another resolution introduced by C.
Blanco of Cuba on behalf of four powers Cuba, Norway,
UK and USA on 14 March 1950, which called upon the

two nations, without prejudice to their rights or claims to
prepare and execute within the stipulated period of five
months for the demilitarization of J&K based on proposals
of McNaughton and for self determination [45] through an
impartial plebiscite. The resolution terminated the UNCIP
and transferred their powers and responsibilities to a UN
representative.

3.10.1 Dixon mediation
Sir Owen Dixon, UN Representative submitted his recommendations to the UN on 15 September 1950. He suggesting a unique proposal [46] limiting the plebiscite only
to the Kashmir Valley claimed by both by Pakistan due to
its Muslim majority and the waters of Jhelum. India and
Pakistan rejected the plan.
UN representatives worked to negotiate for free and impartial plebiscite in J&K until 1953 but their efforts brought
no fruit. The UN continued its efforts for a plebiscite [47],
but all attempts of UN failed due to the conflicting and divergent attitude of the Governments of India and Pakistan
towards the dispute and the cold war [18]. The fifth report
of Dr. Frank P. Graham [48] suggested direct negotiations
between India and Pakistan. Thus the UN attempts at solving the problem of J&K came to end which reflected the
limitations of the UN.
The armies of India and Pakistan waged an inconclusive
war (1947-48) for over a year in J&K. The Indian army
occupied almost two third of J&K remaining 1/3 portion
was under the control of Pakistan which is called Azad
Kashmir or Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK).

3.11 Indo-Pak negotiation (1962-1963)
India experienced a huge defeat in 1962 war against China.
The J&K dispute became the subject of Indo-Pak negotiation in late 1962 but no agreement could be signed for resolution of J& K question despite six round talks between
an Indian delegation headed by Swaran Singh and a Pakistani delegation headed by Z.A. Bhutto from 27 December
1962 and 16 May 1963.

3.12 Sino-Pak border agreement 1963
On 2 March 1963, the Sino-Pakistan Border Agreement
was signed in Peking and they had agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned would reopen negotiations with China on the boundary as described in Article. By this agreement Pakistan [49] succeeded in stabilizing Pakistan’s position regarding Kashmir in the eyes of
Chinese Government and compelling her “to reject unequivocally the contention that Kashmir belonged to India”.

3.13 The Kutch conflict- a low intensity war
In 19 April 1965, Pakistani permanent representative [50]
in UN made claims about 8960 square kilometers area of
Rann. Pakistani claim to the Rann of Kutch was based on
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the fact that the Rann was a lake and according to
international law [51], the boundary line between India and
Pakistan must be drawn through the middle of the Rann.
On other hand India argued that the Rann of Kutch was a
“marsh” land rather than a lake. India asked Pakistan to
restore the status quo ante. Tikka Khan, in command of the
18 Infantry Division, did painstakingly prepare for the
operations and succeeded in advancing inside Indian
territories in strength, causing to the fall of the Indian
forward post hastily positioned there. India and Pakistan
fought a low intensity war. The important aspect of the
conflict lies in the historic fact that both India and Pakistan
accepted a ceasefire and arbitration on British intervention.
On the other hand, India captured some Pakistani Posts in
the Kargil area of Ladakh. The Kutch dispute [52] was
referred to a tribunal comprising of three members, one
nominated by India, another by Pakistan and a Chairman
chosen by the UN Secretary General. After a long
deliberation the tribunal awarded Pakistan 317 square
miles out of 3500 square miles claimed by her. India left
the occupied posts of Pakistan in Kargil.

3.14 Indo-Pak war in 1965
The Pakistani Government was greatly emboldened by
presumably military success in the Rann of Kutch in 1965.
In August 1965 infiltration had started in Jammu and
Kashmir to wage what Zulfikar Ali Bhutto called a “war of
liberation”. On 10 August 1965, Z. A. Bhutto [53] publicly
declared his country’s full support to the people of Kashmir but denied his country’s involvement in the Kashmir
trouble. On 1 September, 1965 Indian forces crossed the
international border and sealed the borders of Kashmir. On
4 September, Malaysia moved a resolution co-sponsored
by Bolivia, the Ivory Cost, Jordan, the Netherlands, and
Uruguay proposing an immediate ceasefire in Kashmir
without calling Pakistan as an aggressor in the UNSC [54].
But it did not succeed in stopping the fighting. Ayub Khan
backed the infiltration with a full-fledged attack in the
Chhamb sector by crossing the international border, leading to effective progress to reach Jaurian. On 5 September
1965, Indian forces launched three-pronged thrust in of
West Pakistan in Lahore Sector and in Sialkot sector a day
later. Following this development, Malaysian representative submitted another resolution [55] supported by Bolivia, the Ivory Cost, Jordan, the Netherlands, and Uruguay
calling upon both the countries to cease hostilities and
withdraw their troops to the positions held by 5 August
1965, which was passed unanimously on 5 September
1965. The goodwill mission to India and Pakistan by the
U.N. Secretary General, U Thant did not succeed. Both
countries were requested by U Thant to stop fighting without imposing any condition on each other [56]. India accepted unconditional ceasefire but President Ayub Khan
[57] imposed certain pre-conditions: (i) Withdrawal of all
forces of both India and Pakistan (ii) Induction of foreign
forces, preferably Afro-Asian under UN auspicious, (iii)
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Holding a Plebiscite in Kashmir within three months of the
cease fire.
Armies of both the countries engaged in large scale combat in a series of sharp and intense actions along
the ceasefire line in J&K and the international border in
Punjab, Rajasthan, and Gujarat by employing import
weaponry system but outmoded war stretegies. They
reached to the point of exhaustion, battle fatigue. The
representative of the Netherlands moved the draft
resolution [58], which was accepted, by both India and
Pakistan in the UNSC on 20 September 1965. It was
adopted by ten votes to nil, with Jordan abstaining. On 20
September 1965, the super power USA concurred with
USSR in the Security Council on calling ceasefire within
48 hours. Pakistan and India accepted the call [59] on 21
and 22 September 1965 respectively. The ceasefire, the
UN enforced became effective at 03:30 hours of 23
September 1965. Both India and Pakistan lost nearly 3000
people each in the war. Economy of both the countries
suffered a setback.
Although fighting ended inconclusive both India and
Pakistan claimed victories,. China identified India as an
aggressor and supported the Kashmiri’s right of selfdetermination.

3.15 Tashkent agreement 1966
The Tashkent Declaration was signed between Indian
Prime Minister L. B. Shastri and Pakistani President after
six days of hard bargaining on 10 January 1966. They
agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries should
be drawn not later than 25 February 1966 to the position
they held prior to 5 August 1965, and both sides should
observe the ceasefire terms on the ceasefire line. They
affirmed to employ peaceful means to solve their conflicts.
Neither side was allowed to enjoy the gains of war.
Pakistan was not even mentioned as the aggressor nor did
it admit having engineered the infiltration in J&K.

3.16 Indo-Pak war in 1971
In the general election held in Pakistan in 7 December
1970, the Awami League led by Mujibur Rehman secured
majority in the national assembly by winning 158 seats out
of 300 seats. He demanded complete autonomy for East
Pakistan. The East Pakistanis formed Mukti Bahini
(Liberation Force) and civil war erupted in East Pakistan.
India supported the Movement. Pakistan used armed forces
to curve the movement. The fighting forced 10 million
East Pakistanis to flee in Indian territories. India accused
the Government of Pakistan of committing brutal genocide
in the East Pakistan. India asked Pakistan to negotiate with
Rehaman for a political settlement. On 3 December 1971,
Pakistan launched attack on Indian airfields along the
frontier of Punjab, Rajasthan, and J&K [60]. On the other
hand, Pakistan alleged that Indian forces attacked on 21
November 1971 in the south- eastern sector of East
Pakistan. India is the first country who recognized formally
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the birth of Bangladesh [61] on 6 December 1971 . The
Indian Army along with the Mukti Bahini (Liberation
Army) fought the Pakistani armed forces. The news of
sending a naval task force from the US Seven Fleet [62] to
the Bay of Bengal from the Indo-China theatre caught
much attention. But the USSR [63] confirmed India that
the Soviet powerful naval fleet would follow the Seven
Fleet. On 15 December 1971 the Indian army reached the
outskirts of Dacca. On 16 December 1971, 9000 Pakistani
forces along with their commander General Niazi
surrendered to the Joint Command of India and
Bangladesh. India declared a unilateral ceasefire [64]
effective from 20:00 hours on 17 December 1971 and
Yahya Khan accepted it. Yahya Khan had to resign
because of huge defeat in East Pakistan. He handed power
to Z.A. Bhutto. Although India and Pakistan fought a
third war over East Pakistan, J&K dispute was only a
peripheral issue but vital one in the case of J&K. At time
of ceasefire, India occupied 204. 7 sq kms of territory of
Pakistan administered Kashmir, 957.31 sq km of Punjab
and 12198.84 sq kms of Kutch while Pakistan occupied
134.58 sq kms of territory of Indian administered J&K in
the Chhamb sector, 175.87 sq kms in Punjab and 1.48 sq
kms in Rajasthan [65].

3.17 Role of UN
The UN intervened to arrange cease-fires during the war
1971. USSR exercised her veto power several times in
favor of India. The Secretary General [66] was authorized
to appointment, if necessary, a special representative to
help in the solution of humanitarian problem. The issue of
Indo-Pak conflict came to an end on 25 December 1971
with the appointment by U Thant, the Secretary General, of
V. W. Guicciardi, as Secretary General’s special
representative for humanitarian problems in India and
Pakistan.

3.18 Simla agreement 1972
The Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan had
talks in Simla from 28 June 1972 to 2 July 1972 and signed
the Simla Agreement [67] on 2 July, 1972. By signing the
agreement, both India and Pakistan committed themselves
to settling their differences through bilateral negotiations
or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon
between them. Hopefully, they also agreed that in “Jammu
and Kashmir, the line of control (LOC) resulting from the
cease-fire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by
both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of
either side”.
The Simla Agreement was ratified by both countries [68]
and it came into force on 5 August 1972. To delineate the
line of control General Bhagat and General Hamid Khan
had to hold ten meetings between 10 August to 7
December 1972. On 11 December 1972, they [69] met at
Suchetgarh and jointly signed 19 maps delineating the line
of control from Chhamb to Turtuk, covering about 800

kilometers. Both the Governments approved the
delineation [70] almost next day. On completion of
adjustment in the line of control, India and Pakistan
withdrew troops from the occupied territories in order to
restore the status quo ante on the international border on 20
December 1972. Pakistan [71] has recognized Bangladesh
in February 1974. The issue regarding prisoner of wars
[72] closed with the repatriation of the last group along
with Gen. Niazi at Wagah on 29 April 1974. East Pakistan
crisis reflected that the two-nation theory failed miserably
in the subcontinent.

3.19 The conflict at Siachen (1984 onwards)
The conflict between India & Pakistan over Siachen originated due to the non-demarcations on the western side of
the map beyond a grid point known as NJ 9842. The CFL,
which was established because of the first Indo-Pak war of
1947-48 and the intervention of the UN, runs along the international Indo-Pak border and then north and northeast
until map grid-point NJ 9842, located near the Shyok River
at the base of the Saltoro mountain range. Unfortunately, it
was not delineated beyond the grid point known as NJ
9842 as far as the Chinese border but both countries agreed
vaguely that the CFL extends to the terminal point NJ
9842, and "thence north to the Glaciers". After second Indo-Pak war in 1965, obeying the Tashkent Agreement both
countries withdrew forces along the 1949 CFL. After third
Indo-Pak war 1971, the Simla Agreement of 1972 created
a new LOC based on December 1971 cease-fire. However,
the Siachen Glacier region was left un-delineated where no
hostilities occurred. The authorities of both countries
showed no interest to clarify the position of the LOC
beyond NJ 9842. Due to lack of strategic viewpoint and seriousness the LOC was poorly described as running from
Nerlin (inclusive to India), Brilman (inclusive to Pakistan),
up to Chorbat La in the Turtok sector. In April 1984, Indian army occupied key mountain Passes and established
permanent posts at the Siachen heights. Indian troops
brought control over two out of three passes on the Siachen, Sia La and Bilfond La, while the third pass, Gyong
La remained under Pakistan's control. The Indian forces
are permanently deployed all along the 110-km long Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL). Armies of both India
and Pakistan fight in lethal 10-22000 foot altitude in Siachen Glacier. Pakistan retaliates in the world’s highest war
zone.

3.20 Kashmir insurgency in Indian administered
Kashmir
The assembly elections in J&K on 23 March 1987 were
partly manipulated and rigged which the National
Conference-Congress coalition won a landslide victory.
The opposition party Muslim United Front (MUF) called
the victory as blatantly fraudulent and rigged. A large
number young people of Kashmir were alienated by this
perception. State Government of J&K witnessed various
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demonstration and agitation between mid-1987 and mid1989 based manifestation of an accumulated anger
comprised of many components such as administrative (the
curtail number of Offices that move to the winter capital
Jammu), the regional autonomy, economic policy (increase
of power tariffs), religious sentiments, civil liberties
(custodian death), and anti-India demonstration of 14 and
15 August, 26 October (accession day) and 26 January. On
8 December 1989, the militants kidnapped Rubaiye Sayeed,
daughter of Indian Home Minster Mufti Mohammed
Sayeed. The prestige of Farooq Abdullah led State
Government suffered serious setbacks for repression of
any form of protest Farooq Abdullah’s resignation with the
appointment of Jagmohan as Governor for the second time
on 19 January 1990, brought Central Government into
direct confrontation with the various rebel groups. At 5 a.
m. on 20 January 1990, Indian paramilitary forces cracked
down on a part of Srinagar city and began the most intense
house-to-house search and rounded up over three hundred
people. Most of them, however, were later released and
arrested persons complained to be beaten up or dragged out
of their houses. People got frightened first, but discovering
the courage of desperation, the people started pouring out
into the street defying the curfew, to protest against the
alleged excessive use of force in search operation in next
day. The administration got completely unnerved and gave
orders to fire at when most of the groups of demonstrators
converged at Gau Kadal. The number of deaths [73, 74] is
disputed; however, the press reported 35 dead. Then the
implicit support for the separatists for independence
transformed into explicit due to mainly the high-handed
searches ordered by Jagmohan, the Governor of J&K. On
19 February 1990 Governor dissolved the State assembly
and Governor rule was imposed. The Jagmohan regime
[13] witnessed sadly the exodus of almost the entire small
Kashmiri Pandit community from the valley and 20000
thousand Muslim had been forced to migrate. The State
assembly election of 1990 resulted in Abdullah downfall
following the outbreak of a Muslim uprising. During the
1990s, several new militant groups were formed, having
radical Islamic views. The large numbers of Islamic Jihadis,
who had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union in
the 1980s, joined the movement
Many umbrella groups were responsible for the uprising in
J&K. Among them, the first umbrella group is tied to the
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). They
demaned independent Kashmir. The second group
comprised of Muslim fundamentalists and has links with
the fundamentalist Pakistan party, Jammait-I- Islam. No
doubt the group has a pro-Pakistan Orientation. The third
group is Jammu and Kashmir People`s League that has a
pro-Pakistan orientation. The groups demanded plebiscite
so that people of J&K could exercise their right of self
determination. India adopted a multiple prolonged
approach to deal with the insurgency in J&K. In 1990, the
then Governor Jagmohan announced the implementation of
Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958 (AFSPA) for
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J&K and J&K Disturbed Areas Act to put down the
militancy. Indian security forces allegedly committed a
series of human right abuses [75] in J&K. It is observed
that the encounter between Indian security forces and the
militants caused more than 50, 000 deaths [75] including
many hundreds of innocent civilians. Kashmiri militants
have been also accused of killing moderate Muslim leaders,
Hindus, bombing passenger busses and railway bridges
and public establishments. In September 1996, National
Conference had won a landslide victory in J&K Assembly
election, although the 30-disparate party coalition, known
as All-Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) did boycott the
election. Indian authorities formed several Muslim
counterinsurgency groups to combat the insurgency along
with Indian security forces. Due to the acute failure of
Indian authorities to address the socio-economic problems
and ambition of autonomy to some extent of the people of
J&K and Pakistan’s active role in fostering cross border
terrorism, the situation in J&K becomes more complex and
volatile and neutrosophic in nature.

3.21 Nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan
India had conducted her first nuclear device in 1974. In
May 1998, India conducted several nuclear tests in the
desert of Rajasthan. Pakistan got the opportunity to conduct nuclear test, and hopefully grabbed the opportunity
and conducted six tests in Baluchistan in order to balancing
nuclear power with India. The arm race between Indo-Pak
caught international attention. The UNSC condemned both
the countries for conducting nuclear tests and urged them
to stop all nuclear weapons program. On 23 September
1998, new development occurred following at UN General
Assembly session. Both India and Pakistan agreed to try to
resolve the Kashmir question peacefully and to focus on
trade and “people to people contact”. Pakistan sent her
cricket team in India as goodwill gesture on November
1998 after a decade absence. On the other hand, India
agreed to buy sugar and powder from Pakistan. In February 1999, bus service between New Delhi to Lahore
started. Accepting an invitation from Sharif, Vajpayee visited Lahore by bus. His visit to Pakistan is known as bus
diplomacy. It drew much attention and at end of the summit they issued Lahore Declaration that was backed by
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) [76].

3.22 Kargil conflict in 1999
In May 1999, Pakistan –backed militants together with Pakistani regular forces crossed the LOC and infiltrated into
India-held Kargil region of North Kashmir. The militants
occupied covertly more than thirty well-fortified positions
the most inhospitable frigidly cold ridges at an altitude of
16000 -18000 feet, in the Great Himalayan range facing
Dras, Kargil, Batalik and the Mushko Valley sectors. India
retaliated by launching air attacks known as ‘Operation Vijay (victory) on 26 May 1999. India identified Pakistan as
an aggressor that violated the LOC. As the battle turned
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more intense, the Clinton administration intervened to help
defuse the conflict. It was witnessed that on 15 June Clinton made separate telephonic conversations with both the
Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. He asked Sharif to
withdraw infiltrators from across the LOC. He cordially
appreciated Vajpayee for his display of restraint in the conflict. Pakistan was isolated from world community regarding the Kargil-issue, only Saudi Arabia and United Emirates supported Pakistan. On 4 July 1999, Sharif and Clinton held a three-hour meeting and issued a joint communiqué in which Sharif agreed to withdraw the intruders. On
11 July 1999, in accordance with the agreement the infiltrators started retreating from Kargil as India set 16 July,
1999 as the dead line for the total withdrawal. On 12 July
1999, Sharif defended his 4 July agreement with Mr. Clinton and defended his Kargil policy that designed to draw
the international attention of the international community
to Kashmir issue. In the war [77], India lost more than 400
forces. 670 intruders and 30 Pakistani regular forces were
also killed excluding the injured.

3.23 Agra summit (14-16 July 2001)
Agra Summit was held between the Indian Prime Minister
Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf in Agra, from July 14 to 16, 2001. The summit began amid high hopes of resolving various disputes between
the two countries including complex J&K issue. Both sides
remained inflexible on the core issue of J&K and ultimately the bilateral summit failed to produce any formal
agreement.

3.24 The threat of war between India and Pakistan and
the role of Bush administration
On 13 December 2001, five militants attacked Indian national parliament house causing the deaths of 13 people including five terrorists. India held Pakistan responsible for
the incidence. India immediately reacted by deploying a sizeable force along the LOC in J&K. Pakistan followed
suit, until both nations had aligned a vast array of troops
and weapons against one another. Armies of both countries
frequently exchanged of artillery fires. The mobilization of
troops sparked worldwide fears of a deadly military conflict between India and Pakistan.
In order to defuse the growing tensions Bush Administration took initiatives and succeeded in getting both sides to
make conciliatory move. On 12 January 2002, in his address to his nation, Musharraf committed Pakistan’s “political, diplomatic and moral” support to the struggle of
people of Kashmir. He went on to criticize the Pakistani
militant Islamic groups for i) creating violent activities, ii)
aggravating internal instability, iii) harboring sectarianism
in Pakistan politics iv) creating war like situation against
India. He banned two militant groups, the Lasker-e-Toiba
and Jais-e- Mohammed. In the following weeks, 2,000 activists of the banned militant groups were arrested in Pakis-
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tan. Musharraf regime closed down some of militants
groups’ offices and recruiting centers. India welcomed
these measures cautiously and the tension was somewhat
defused. On May 14, 2002, three militants disguised in Indian Army uniforms shot passengers indiscriminately on a
public bus and then killed 40 people (mostly wives and
children of army personnel) including eight bus passengers
at Kaluchak of Jammu before militants were gunned down.
India reacted by threatening to strike at the terrorist camps
situated in POK and took tough stand declaring some
measures: i) expelled the Ambassador of Pakistan to India,
ii) withdrew her diplomatic personnel from Pakistan, iii)
imposed ban on Pakistani commercial air flights from Indian air space, iv) mobilized 100000 Indian forces close to
LOC.
On 22 May 2002, on his visit to the frontlines in J&K,
Vajpayee called for a “decisive battle”. Pakistani authority
declared that it would defend Pakistani administered
Kashmir by any cost. Musharraf mobilized 50,000 troops
to the borders. On 27 May 2002, Musharraf [78] warned
India by declaring, “if war is thrust upon us, we will respond with full might”.
Even Pakistan threatened to use nuclear weapons against
India. This threat drew pointed attention to the USA and
UK. The British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw and US
Deputy of Secretary, Richard Armitage and Defense Secretary, Donald Ramsfeld rushed to both India and Pakistan in
May-June 2002 in order to defuse tension. They were successful in their mission to defuse tension and succeeded in
getting promise from Musharraf to stop cross-border infiltration into J&K. After witnessing a slowdown in infiltration, India tried to improve her relation with Pakistan by
reestablishing diplomatic ties, recalling her naval ships to
their Bombay base, and opening her airspace to Pakistani
commercial flights.
3.25 Musharraf’s proposals for J&K resolution
On 25 October 2004, while addressing an ‘Iftar party’,
President Musharraf announced an important declaration
regarding settlement of the J&K acceptable to Pakistan,
India and people of J&K. He remarked that the solution
would have to be met thee steps:
i)
Both sides should identify the regions on both
sides of LOC,
ii)
Demilitarize these regions,
iii)
Determine their status through independence or
joint control or UN mandate.
He opinioned that Pakistanis demand for a plebiscite was
impractical while India’s offer for making LOC a permanent border was unacceptable. The Musharraf’s announcements drew much attention but Indian Prime Minister M. Singh refused to comment describing them as “of
the cut remarks”.
President Musharraf [79] proposed four point solutions regarding the resolution of J&K disputes as follows:
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i)

troops will be withdrawn from the region in a
staggered manner
the border will remain unchanged, however
ii)
people will be allowed to move freely in the region
iii)
self governance or autonomy but not independence
iv)
a joint management mechanism will be created
with India, Pakistan and Kashmiri Representatives
On 5 December 2006, during an interview with NDTV
President Musharraf opinioned that Pakistan is prepared to
give up her claim on Kashmir, also ready to give up her old
demand for a plebiscite and forget all UN resolution if India accepts the four-point resolution of Kashmir dispute offered by him. He remarked that Pakistan is absolutely
against the independence of Kashmir so is India. He stated
that for compromise solution both countries would have to
give up their positions and step back.
On 31 December 2006, G. N. Azad, the Chief Minister of
J&K stated that ‘joint mechanism” is possible in the field
of trade, water, tourism and culture, and this could lead the
way for a resolution to the longstanding Kashmir problem.
On 8 January 2007, he further stated that the latest four
point-solution offered by President Musharraf should not
be put aside without discussing positively.
On 19 January 2007, following the meeting with Indian
External Affairs Minister, Chief Minister, G. N. Azad of
J&K said “The date for the composite dialogue has been
fixed for 13-14 March 2007 and I am sure all outstanding
issues and proposals floated from time to time by President
Musharraf will be discussed.” On the same day APHC
leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq told the BBC that the next
three months would be crucial.
On 2 February 2007, President Musharraf said: “We cannot take people on board who believe in confrontation and
who think that only militancy solves the problem”. On 3
February 2007, Indian Prime Minister M. Singh welcomed
President Musharraf’s statement that militancy or violence
cannot resolve the Kashmir issue. On 4 February 2007, Indian External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee commented on Musharraf’s proposals: “It is good. Everybody
should advise terrorists to give up violence and join the
process of dialogue.” The idea of four point resolution was
purely personal that did not have the mandate. However,
Musharraf had to resign from his post for internal problem.
His endeavor to resolve the J&K problem failed due to no
response from India.

3.26 Terror attack at Mumbai
On 26 November 2008, Mumbai, the capital of Maharastra
and financial capital of India witnessed deadly terror attacks. India adopted a tougher-than –usual stand against
Pakistan in the wake of the Mumbai terror attack and demanded to hand over 20 terrorists including Pakistan-based
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underworld Dawood Ibrahim and Jaish-e-Mohammad chief
Maulana Masood Azhar staying in Pakistan. . To defuse
the tension between India and Pakistan, Secretary of State
of the USA, Condoleeza Rice visited Indian subcontinent.
Ultimately USA succeeded in defusing the tension.

3.27 Is China a third party in J&K conflict?
Indian stand on the question is contradictory, ambiguous
and unclear and neutrosophic in nature. India strongly objected the border agreement between Pakistan and China
signed in 1963 by which China gained 2700 square miles
of the Pakistan occupied Kashmir. Based on the Simla
Agreement 1972 between India and Pakistan, India strongly is of the opinion that J&K problem is a bilateral dispute.
Third party involvement is not welcomed by India to resolve the issue. However, Pakistan wants that China would
play a definite role to resolve the J&K conflict. China
adopts a neutral role as seen in the Kargil conflict in 1999.
So, depending upon Simla Agreement, Indian point of
view and present status, J&K conflict is considered as a bilateral problem between India and Pakistan.
3.28 Internal development in Indian administered J&K
Special status was conferred on J&K under Article 370 of
Indian Constitution [80]. Constituent Assembly was
elected by J&K on 31 October, 1951. The accession of
J&K to India was ratified by the State’s Constituent Assembly in 1954. The Constituent Assembly also ratified the
Maharaja’s accession of 1947 in 17 November 1956. In
1956, the category of part B was abolished and J&K was
included as one of the States of India under article 1. On
January 26, 1957 Constituent Assembly dissolves itself.
On 30 March 1965, article 249 of Indian Constitution extended to J&K whereby the Central Government at New
Delhi could legislate on any matter enumerated in state list.
Designation like Prime Minister and Sarder-i-Riyasat are
replaced by Chief Minster and Governor respectively. In
1964, decision to extend Articles 356 and 357 of the Union
Constitution of India to J&K announced. On 12 February
1975, Chief Minister Abdullah signed Kashmir Accord
that affirmed its status as a constituent unit of the India and
the State J&K will be governed by Article 370 of the Constitution of India.

3.29 Development of
Jammu and Kashmir

Pakistan

administered

Azad Kashmir was established on 24 October 1947. The
UNCIP resolution depicts the status of Azad Kashmir as
neither a sovereign state nor a province of Pakistan, but
rather a "local authority" with responsibility over the area
assigned to it under the ceasefire agreement. The "local
authority" or the provisional government of Azad Kashmir
had handed over matters related to defense, foreign affairs,
negotiations with the UNCIP and coordination of all affairs
relating to Gilgit and Baltistan to Pakistan under the
Karachi Agreement [81] of April 28, 1949.
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Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s government virtually annexed the
POK by promulgating the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Act
of 1974. Azad Kashmir adopts Islam as the state religion
vide Article 3. The constitution prohibits activities
prejudicial or detrimental to the ideology of the State's
accession to Pakistan (Article 7). It disqualifies nonMuslims from election to the Presidency and prescribed in
the oath of office the pledge 'to remain loyal to the country
and the cause of accession of the State of Jammu and
Kashmir to Pakistan'. It provides two executive forums,
namely the Azad Kashmir government in Muzaffarabad
and the Azad Kashmir council in Islamabad. The Pakistan
government can dismiss any elected government in Azad
Kasmir irrespective of the support it may enjoy in the Azad
Kasmir Legislative Assembly [82] by applying the Section
56 of the constitution,. The Northern Areas have the status
of a Federally Administered Area.

Table 1: Payoff matrix
Pakistan

India

I
II
III
IV

I
1
0
0
1

II
-1
-1
-1
0

Pakistan strategy vector:
i) Full compliance with Simla Agreement 1972,
ii) Partial or non-compliance with Simla agreement 1972
India’s strategy vector:
i) Make territorial concessions,
ii) Accept the third party mediation ( USA),
iii) Apply the strategy of all-out military campaign,
iv) Continue fencing along the LOC (see Fig. 1).

3.30 The Indo-Pak conflict over Jammu
and Kashmir
The conflict was based on the neutrosophic explanation
and understanding of the neutrosophic situation in India
and Pakistan. From Pakistani point of view, she hoped
J&K was going to accede to Pakistan as the majority of the
population being Muslims. If Junagadh, despite its Muslim
rulers’ accession to Pakistan, belonged to India because of
its Hindu majority, then Kashmir surely belonged to Pakistan. Princely state Hydrabad became Independent on 15
August 1947 like J&K. But India invaded it because of
Hindu majority. Pakistan regarded the Accession of J&K
as a coerced attempt to force the hand of Maharaja. Popular outbursts took place but J&K had acceded to India, because the ruler was a Hindu. From Indian point of view,
J&K had acceded to her. Armed Pakistani raiders having
Pakistani complicity and support invaded some portion of
J&K. Both the countries failed to implement the UN resolutions. The plebiscite has never been held. India viewed
that that the time has changed. India strongly argues that
legislative measures subsequently legitimized the question
of accession. After Simla Agreement, J&K problem became bilateral issue and its solution should be based on
Simla Agreement 1972.

4 Neutrosophic game theoretic model formulation
of the Indo-Pak conflict over Jammu and Kashmir
Following the above discussion and based on Simla
Agreement 1972 , game theoretic model is formulated.
The problem is modeled as a standard two person (2×2)
zero-sum game.

Fig.1 Photograph of fence along LOC
The above payoff matrix has been constructed with
reference to the row player i.e. India. In the process of
formulating the payoff matrix, it is assumed that the
combination (I, I) will hopefully resolve the conflict while
the combination (IV, II) will basically imply a status quo
with continuing conflict. If Pakistan can get India to either
make territorial concessions (Muslims dominated Kashmir
valley or other important stragic areas of J&K such Kargil)
or accept the third party mediation like USA without fully
complying with the Simla Agreement i.e. strategy
combinations (I, II) and (II, II), then it reflects that
Pakistan will be benefited but India will be loser. If India
accepts the third party mediation and Pakistan agrees to
comply fully with the Simla Agreement, then though it
potentially ends the conflict, there should be a political
jeopardy in India as a result of lack of strategic and
political concensus among the political parties and so the
strategy combination (II, I) is not a favorable payoff for
India. If India employs an all-out military campaign, an
devastating war seems to occur as both the countries are
capable of using nuclear powers i.e. strategy combination
(III, I) would not produce a positive payoff for either side.
If there occurs a unexpected and sudden change of mind
set up for J&K within the Pakistani leaderships (from
inside or outside pressure) and Pakistan chooses to fully
abide by the Simla Agreement 1972 considering LOC as
the permanent international border i.e. strategy
combination (IV, I) will bring a potential end to the
conflict as both countries may think that they will be loser
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and winner at the same time (neutrosophically true) in the
sense that they will not get the whole J&K but Pakistan
can cansole her saying that she has gained one third of
J&K while India may think she gained two third of J&K.
In the payoff matrix (see Table 1), all the elements of the
first, second and third rows are less than or equal to the
corresponding elements of the forth row, therefore from
the game theory [83] point of view, forth row dominates
the first three rows. On the other hand, every element of
the first column is greater than the corresponding elements
of the second column, therefore, first column is dominated
by second column. It shows that the above game has a
saddle point having the strategy combination (IV, II),
which reflects that in their very attempt to out-bargain each
other both countries actually end up continuing the conflict
indefinitely! Thus the model model offers an equilibrium
solution.
In the subcontinent political arena, Pakistani leadership’s
best interest was to transform the conflict more complex
and keep the conflict more alive with full strenght to gain
political support from inside and outside and ultimately
compelled India to make territorial or other concessions.
However, for international pressure mainly from USA,
Pakistan had to state some overt declaration that negotiated
settlement over J&K based on Simla Agreement 1972 is
possible. However, Pakistan covertly continues her sincere
help to separatist groups by means of monetary, logical,
psychological and military equipments. By doing so
Pakistan is now in deep troubal with various militant
groups and Jihadi groups. She has to deal internal security
probles caused by Pakistani Taliban groups. Under such
volatile circumstances, it would be quite impossible for
Pakistan to chalk out a distinct governing strategy to meet
with counter strategy.
Both the countries, in general, played their games under
international pressure. Although Pakistan signed Lahore
declaration with India by the then Prime Minister Nawaj
Sarif, Pakistani military boss Mr. Musharraf occupied
some heights of Kargil in 1999 to derail the peace process
and draw international attention to the J&K conflict. An
important lesson of the Kargil conflict seems to be that no
military expedition could be a success if it is pursued
without paying to serious attention to the totality of the
scenarios having domestic, political, economic,
geographical, international opinions and sensitivities.
Another important of Kargil conflict seems that national
community does not want to military solution relating to
J&K problem. However, one positive aspect of the Lahore
declaration reflects that both the countries are capable of
transforming the game scenario an open one in the sense
that the conflicting countries are capable of dynamically
constructing and formulating objectives and strategies in
the course of their peaceful, mutual interaction within a
formally defined socio- political set up.
During the Agra summit in 2001, when probably President
Musharraf was thinking to make the conflict very alive
while offering the impression to the other side (India) that
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they were wholeheartedly seeking strategies to put an end
the conflict. President Musharraf played very clever and
diplomatic role by using the media very cautiously and
cleverly to make the international community and his
country understand that he tries his level best to reach a
meaningful, desicive and effective agreement but fails due
to Indian rigid position regarding J&K issue. He left Agra
and thereby tried to obtain his acceptance to his own nation
and international community. This immediately shows why
such a negotiation would break down at early stage.
The government of India and Pakistan are dealing with
militancy and terrorism in own land. But main issue
remains the J&K conflict.

4.1 Case for applying neutrosophic game theory
It is experienced that none of the strategy vectors available
to either side will remain temporarily stationary because
crucial events come into light on the global political arena,
in general, and the south Asian subcontinent in particular.
Moreover, there is a broad variety of ambiguities about the
motives behind Pakistan authority’s primary goals about
the driving force behind Pakistan authority’s primary goal
and the strategies it adopts to achieve that goal.
Pakistan’s principal ally USA is also a great factor. The
influence of USA has a great impact on forming strategies.
The terrorist activities by Pakistan baked terrorist groups
are sometimes monitored by the wishes of USA. Although
Pakistan has not hundred percent control over foreign
mercenaries coming from different part of world namely,
Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Chechnia, Sudan etc. Pakistan
is constantly trying to bring India under pressure by
harboring terrorist attacks on Indian ruled Kashmir and
destabilizing the normalcy in the state in order to
understand the international community that international
intervention is requierd to resolve the J&K conflict. It is
also difficult to state apart a true bargaining strategy from
one just meant to be a political decay. In the horizon of
continuous conflict, we believe and advocate an
application of the conceptual framework of the
neutrosophic game theory as a generalization of the
dynamic fuzzy game paradigm.
It generalized terms, a well-specified dynamic game at a
particular time t is a particular interaction between decision
makers with well-defined rules and regulations and roles
for the decision makers, which remain in place at time t but
are free to change over time. However, it is likely that the
decision makers may suffer from the role of ambiguity i.e.
a typical situation where none of the decision makers are
exactly sure what to expect from others or what the other
decision makers expect from them. In the context of indoPak continuing conflict, for example, Pakistan leadership
would probably not have been sure of its role when Mr.
Musharraf met with Indian prime minister Atal Behari
Vajpayee at the Agra summit to chalk out a peace
agreement. Mr. Musharuff went to that summit under the
international pressure or to prove himself to be an efficient
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leader of Pakistan or against his free will and would have
liked to avoid Agra if he could because he did not want to
sign any final agreement on J&K which can be against
common
feeling of people of Pakistan. Mushauff
demanded for declaration of J&K to be a disputed territory
at least. Having no such capitulation forthcoming from
India, Musharuff left Agra without signing any joint
statement.
In this political context, Pakistani leadership’s best interest
was to keep the conflict alive with full strength ultimately
compelled India to make territorial or other concession.
However, for international pressure mainly from USA,
Pakistan had to offer some overt declaration that
negotiated settlement over Jammu and Kashmir based on
Simla Agreement 1972 is possible. Pakistan covertly
continues her sincere help separatist groups by means of
monetary, logical, psychological and military equipments.
Under such volatile circumstances, it would be quite
impossible to chalk out a distinct governing strategy to
meet with counter strategy.
However, both the countries, in general, played their
games under international pressure. Although Pakistan
signed Lahore declaration with India by the then Prime
Minister Nawaj Sarif, Pakistani military boss Mr.
Musharraf occupied some heights of Kargil in 1999 to
derail the peace process. An important lesson of the Kargil
conflict seems to be that no military expedition could be a
success if it is pursued without paying to serious attention
to the totality of the scenario having domestic, political,
economic, geographical, international opinions and
sensitivities. Another important of Kargil conflict seems
that national community does not want to military solution
relating to Kashmir problem. However, one positive
aspect about Lahore declaration or Indo-Pak joint
declaration indicates they transform the game scenario an
open one in the sense that the conflicting parties are
capable of dynamically constructing and formulating
objectives and strategies in the course of their peaceful,
mutual interaction within a formally defined sociopolitical set up.
Thus, the negotiation space may be represented as:
NPakistan ∩ NIndia .
According to the opinion of Burns and Rowzkowska [84]
each players personal views constitute a deal. The fuzzy
semantic space comprises of such deals i.e. personal views.
Personal value judgments, acquired experiences and
expectations about the possible best or worst outcomes
from a negotiation are crucial to constitute such views. The
fuzzy semantic space is a dynamical system and is free to
modify according to the need and desire of the players and
practical situations in the light of new information.
The semantic space however remains fuzzy owing to
vagueness about the exact objectives and lack of precise
understanding of the exact stand, which the opponent
parties have from their viewpoints. That is why none of the

conflicting parties can effectively read and precisely
understand each other’s nature of expectations.
This was reflected in Agra summit when probably
Musharraf (Pakistan) was thinking in terms of keeping the
conflict alive while offering the impression to the other
side (India) that they were wholeheartedly seeking
strategies to put an end the conflict. Mr. Musharraf played
very diplomatic role by using the media very cautiously
and cleverly to make the international community and his
country understand he tried his level best to reach a fruitful
agreement but failed and left at midnight and thereby tried
to obtain his acceptance to his own nation and international
community. This immediately comes to light why such a
negotiation would break down at early stage.
If the Indo-Pak conflict over Jammu and Kashmir is
constituted as fuzzy dynamic fuzzy bargaining game, the
players’ fuzzy set judgment functions over expected
outcomes can be formulated as follows according to the
rules of well-developed fuzzy set theory due to Zadeh [85]
For Pakistan, the fuzzy evaluative judgment function at
time t, μ J ( P, t ) (P, t) will be represented by fuzzy set
membership function as follows:
μ J (Ρ , t ) =

∈(0.5,1),
0.5,
0,

for Ο Worst < x < Ο Best
for x = Ο Worst
for x < Ο Worst

Here, the symbol Ο Best indicates the best possible outcome
that Pakistan would expect; which would probably the
annexation of Jammu-Kashmir to Pakistan according to the
two-nation theory of Muslim League. Similarly, Ο Worst
indicates probably the conversion of LOC as the
permanent international borderline.
On the other hand, for India the fuzzy evaluative judgment
function at time t, J (I, t) will be represented by the fuzzy
set membership function μ J ( Ι , t ) as follows:

1,
∈(0.5,1),
μ J (Ι, t ) =
0.5,
0,

for y ≥ Θ Best
for Θ Worst < y < Θ Best
for y = Θ Worst
for y ≤ Θ Worst

Here Θ Worst indicates the worst possible negotiation
outcome India could expect, which would be coincidence
with the best-expected outcome for Pakistan.
It is to be noted that semantic space NPakistan ∩ NIndia is
more generally framed as a neutrosophic semantic space,
which considers a three-way generalization of the fuzzy
semantic space. Since neutrosophic semantic space
comprises of neutral possibility, it cannot be defuzzified
into two crisp zero-one states owing to the incorporation of
an intervening state of “indeterminacy”.
Such
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indeterminacy would be practically encountered due to the
fact any mediated, two-way negotiation process is likely to
become over catalyst by the subjective utility preferences
of the mediator.
Let T, I, F represent real subsets of the real standard unit
interval [0,1]. Statically, T, I, F are subsets while
dynamically, in the context of a dynamic game, they may
be considered as set-valued vector functions. If a logical
proposition is said to be t % true in T, i % indeterminate in
I and f % false in F, then T, I, F are considered as the
neutrosophic components. According to Smarandache [7]
neutrosophic probability is useful to events that are
shrouded in a veil of indeterminacy like the actual implied
volatile of long-term options. Bhattacharya et al.y applied
the concept of neutrosophic probability in order to
formulate neutrosophic game theretic model [86] to Israel
–Palestine conflict. It is worthy of mention that the
proposed approach uses a subset-approximation for truthvalues, indeterminacy and falsity-values. It is capable of
providing a better approximation than classical probability
to uncertain events.
Therefore, the neutrosophic evaluative function for
Pakistan at time t, JN(P, t) will be represented by the
neutrosophic set membership function μ J N (Ρ , t ) (x ) as
follows:
(.5, 1), for O Worst < x < O Best , x ∈T
μ J N (Ρ , t ) (x ) = .5, for x = O Worst , x ∈T
0, for x < O Worst , x ∈T

On the other hand, the neutrosophic evaluative judgment
function for India at time t, JN(I, t) will be represented by
the neutrosophic set membership function μ J N (Ι,t ) (y) as
follows:
μ J N (Ι,t ) (y) =
1,
∈(0.5, 1),
0.5,
0,

for y ≥ Θ Best , y ∈F
for Θ Worst < y < Θ Best , y ∈F
for y = Θ Worst , y ∈F
for y ≤ Θ Worst , y ∈F

Relying on three-way classification of neutrosophic
semantic space, it is t %true in sub-space that bilateral
negotiation will produce a favourable outcome within the
evaluative judgment space of the Pakistan while it is f %
false in the sub-space F that the outcome will be favorable
within the evaluative judgment space of the Pakistan.
However, there is an i % indeterminacy in sub-space I
whereby the nature of the outcome may be neither
favorable nor unfavorable within the evaluative judgment
space of either competitor.
5 Conclusion

We have discussed the crisis dynamics of the continuing
Indo-Pak conflict over J&K. we have briefly examined the
efforts made by various study groups and persons and

India and Pakistan in resolving the conflict and the reasons
for their failure. We have looked the Indo-Pak relations
and recent developments and their views on J&K situations.
Alternative possible solutions are also considered. Most of
the solutions are either impractical or unacceptable to India,
Pakistan, and or the various militant groups. Pro Pakistani
militant groups and Pakistan would opt for free and
impartial plebiscite. Even some militant groups would
oppose the plebiscite because the UNSC resolutions do not
offer them the very option of independence. In the process
of formulating the payoff matrix for game theory model,
the combination (I, I) will hopefully resolve the conflict i.e.
maintaining the status quo along the LOC with some
border adjustments favorable to Pakistan. Otherwise, the
the proposed model offers the solution wich state that both
the countries will continue the conflict indefinitely. The
application of game theoretic method to the ongoing IndoPak conflict over J&K is based on identifying and
evaluating the best options that each side has and is trying
to achieve chosen options. The Simla Agreement 1972 is
used as an instance with Pakistan being left to choose
between two mutually exclusive options.
The solution reflects the real facts that Pakistan does not
want to ever agree to have full compliance with the Simla
Agreement 1972, as she will see always herself worse off
that way. Realizing that Pakistan will never actually
comply with Simla Agreement 1972, India will find her
best interest to continue the status quo with an ongoing
conflict, as she will see herself ending up on the worse end
of the bargaining if she chooses to apply any other strategy.
It is experienced that none of the strategy vectors available
to either side will remain temporally stationary due to
action and reaction of militant groups and Indain securty
forces in J&K. Moreover, there exists a broad variety of
ambiguities concerning primary goals of the two countries
and the strategies they adopt to achieve those goals.
Due to the impact of globalization, people have to interact
with people from other countries. In the days of crossborder strategic alliances and emphasis on various groups,
it would really be tragic if other nations remain standstill
or ignore the conflict. The government of India fails to
solve its own problems of northeast states such as
Nagaland, Assam, Mizoram, and Arunachal Pradesh. On
the other hand, Pakistan is constantly facing with the
myriad problems of democracy and absence of it. Pakistan
fails to curve insurgencies in Balochistan, the largest
province of Pakistan having resource of natural gas and
mineral and sparsely populated. We have discussed the
development of the Jammu and Kashmir conflict. We have
examined the various efforts by Indo-Pak and other
countries to resolve the grave conflict. The effect of
nuclear power acquisition by both the countries,9/11 terror
attack on USA and USA and its allies invasion in Iraq. The
most beneficiary party of Jammu and Kashmir conflict is
the republic of China. It invaded about 38000 square
kilometers territory from Indian ruled Jammu and Kashmir
in 1962 war and later Pakistan ceded 5180 square
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kilometers areas to Beijing under a 1963 pact. The ongoing
conflict between and Pakistan reflects the fact that both the
countries are incapable of solving J&K conflict and other
core issues. At the international level, third party
arrangements can be established with the participation of
an intervening state, group of states, or international
organizations in order to play a crucial role in helping to
overcome a strategic impasse. The question remains
whether India and Pakistan would accept third party
mediation. Limits on international direct intervention in the
J&K grave conflict have historically had to do with India’s
insistence that the 1972 Simla Agreement between India
and Pakistan is sufficient to deal with the issue bilaterally.
It is to noted that when well conceived and pragmatic,
India has come to appreciate mediation by international
third party specially USA mediation in Kargil crisis in
1999 and 2001-2002 mobilization crisis.
μ J N (Ρ , t ) (x ) or μ J N (Ι, t ) (y) would be interpreted as Pakistan’s
(or India’s) degree of satisfaction with the negotiation
based settlement. It is likely that Pakistan authority’s
ultimate objective is to annex J&K and if that is the case
then of course there will always be an unbridgeable
incongruence between μ J N (Ρ , t ) (x ) and μ J N (Ι, t ) (y) due to
mutually inconsistent evaluative judgment spaces between
India and Pakistan to the conflict. Therefore, for any form
of negotiation in order to produce a positive result, the
first and foremost requirement should be to make the
evaluative judgment spaces consistent. On the other hand,
if the evaluative judgment spaces are inconsistent, the
negotiation space will generate into a null set at the very
onset of the bargaining process, thereby pre-empting any
equilibrium solution different from the status quo. Since
these spaces are not crisp, according to Reiter [87] they are
malleable to some extent. Therefore, even while retaining
their core forms, subtle changes could be induced for
making these spaces workably consistent. Then the goal of
the mediator should be such that it will allow India and
Pakistan to redefine their primary objectives without
necessarily feeling that such redefinition itself reflects a
concession. When this type of redefinition of primary
objectives has been achieved, the evaluative judgment
spaces generate a negotiation space that will not become
null ab initio. However, it should be mentioned that there
exists also an indeterminate aspect to any process of
mediated bilateral dialogues between the two countries
becasue of the catalyzation effect brought about the
subjective utility preferences of the mediator.
We build on an earlier attempted justification of a game
theoretic explanation of the Indo-Pak conflict over J&K by
Pramanik and Roy [6] and go on to argue in favor of a
neutrosophic adaptation of the standard 2x2 zero-sum
game theoretic model in order to identify an optimal
outcome. We hope that the concept of the interval
neutrosophic set [88] can be used to formulate interval
neutrosophic game theoretic model of the Indo-Pak
conflict in more general way. From ancient period J&K

was a place of religious center and different people with
their different faiths live together peacefully. But, poeple
of J&K are at present neutrosophically divided in the
question of independent of J&K. The disintegration of
India based on two nation theory does not provide any
good for the people of Indian subcontinent. So people of
Indian subcontinent can neutrosophically hope that India
and Pakisatn will rethink their decision of partition based
on vaguely defined two nation theory. Rather India and
Pakistancan form a union of indepent states by considering
their origin, culteral heristage, common interest, blood
relation. If East Germany and West Germany are able to
get united, why not the subcontinent? According to
neutrosophy nothing is impossible. So according to
neutrosophy, the resolution of J&K is neutrosophically
possible. The present paper provides the conceptual
framework of neutrosophic game theroetic model of the
complex J&K conflict hoping that neotrosophic linear
programming will be able to solve the problem in near
future.
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